Fertility declines across Europe and the Anglo-world have been explained as the result of reversals of intergenerational flows of wealth. According to this theory, the child was transformed from an economically-useful household asset to an emotionally-valued parental burden. This articlei sb ased on ac omparative study of changing understandings of parenthood in three provincial English localities between 1850 and 1914. It works from the premise that in order to make sense of reproductive behaviour, it is essential to examine the meanings that men and women attached to childlessness, child-rearing and parenthood.
Women who married in England in the 1860s bore an average of more than six children while their granddaughters who married in the 1910s bore fewer than three children, as the nationalb irth-rate movedt owards its nadiri n1 933 ( Anderson, 1990, pp. 28, 39) . Some have explained thisd emographic change as the result of at ransformative reversal of 'intergenerational flows of wealth'. Birth control practices diffusedd own the class hierarchy as couples across Europe and the Anglo-world rationally adjusted to new socioeconomiccircumstances (Becker, 1981; Caldwell, 1976) . At the heart of this theory is the shift from the child as an economically-usefulassetwithin the household economy to the economically-dependent 'sacred'c hild within the affective nuclear family (Gillis, 1996; Zelizer, 1985, p. 295 ). Yet there is an eed for qualitative studies to assess the extent to which men and women did interpret their interaction with their daughters and sons in this way. This article arguest hat an understanding of the changing and diverse relationships betweengenerations is essential in explaining why fertility declined as it did before 1914.
Most recent studies have emphasised the variety and complexity of reproductive behavioural change (Janssens, 2007a; Woods,1 987, pp. 309-311) . Drawing principally on evidence from the 1911 censuso fm arried women'sf ertility, Szreter has argued that British couples' decisions to reduce their family sizewere prompted by reassessments of the 'perceived relative costs of child-rearing'. These decisions were based on married adults' gendered roles within 'communication communities', determined principally for the workingclass by local labour markets and for the middle class by national social status groupings (Szreter, 1996, pp. 546, 554) . Quantitative analysis of fertility in 13 English districts similarly emphasised the strength of 'community' norms (Garrett, Reid, Schü rer, &Szreter,2001) . Comparative studies in other nationalcontexts have shown that religious denomination and ethnicity affected patterns of fertilityt hrough distinctive attitudes to family, sexuality and the planning of life-course events (Derosas &V an Poppel, 2006; Janssens, 2007b; McQuillan, 2004; Praz, 2005) . It is not knownwhether there were distinctive understandings of raising children in England that resulted in diverse patterns of fertilityo rw here boundaries between' communities' lay. Nevertheless,i ti sw idely acceptedt hat it is necessary to move beyond 'average' national narratives, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
In quantitative terms, the use of the mean number of children born per woman in her fertile years has been called into question by the presence of divergent and extreme sub-groups. One such group was the increasingly large minorityo fc ouples with 'highly restricted fertility', whosemarriagesremained childless or resulted in the birth of only one child (Anderson, 1998; Rothery, 2009, pp. 679-682) . Micro-level longitudinal studies have suggested that some couples pioneeredthe adoption of new 'reproductive strategies' that reacted to the fall in child and infant mortality, so as to achieve as mall 'ideal (net) family size' (Reher &S anz-Gimeno, 2007; Van Poppel, Reher, Sanz-Gimeno,S anchezDominguez, &Beekink, 2012, p. 325) . In the Netherlands from the 1870s these active and planning couples were drawn from Liberal Protestant skilled and elite backgrounds,a nd thus of as imilar class to those identified by Andersonw ith extremely low fertility (Van Bavel &Kok, 2010b) . It has been suggested that Belgian restricted fertility was part of a 'defensive strategy' to prevent intergenerationald ownward social mobility, especially amongst the middleclass (Van Bavel,Moreels, Van de Putte, &Matthijs, 2011, p. 338) . In exploring these distributions, the attitudeso fa dults who did not rapidly follow what demographers class as the 'pioneering' trend towards investing in few 'high quality' children shouldbet aken as seriously as the perceptions of those who did.
Thet endency to focus on as mooth, national narrative of increasing reproductive control applies equally to qualitative research. Scholars have examined the scandals generated by the publication and reception of birth control advice (Banks &B anks, 1954; Caldwell, 1999; Cohen, 1993 ). Yet, more everyday, oral and implicit -a nd thus potentially more morally secure -s ettings coulda lsob ei nfluential contexts in which family size was thought about in new ways (Watkins, 1990) . Oral historytestimonieshave provided mostqualitative evidence for thesecontexts in which knowledge of reproduction was communicated or silenced. Testimonies provide rich and apparently frank insights into attitudes to sex and sexuality, but unavoidablyonly offer historians the narratives of individuals who reached adulthood in the early or mid-twentieth century, decades after couples had started reducing their family size (Beier, 2008; Szreter &F isher, 2010) .
Since the 1980s the conceptofthe gender-less demographic actor has been challenged through studies that have emphasised the need to explore the different motivations of, and power relations between, men and women, which cannot be identified in quantitative data (Janssens, 2007b; Mackinnon, 1995; Watkins, 1993 ). Yet there is little historiographical consensus on the relative importanceofopen spousal conflict, unspokentensions, strategic negotiation, or marital agreement on distinct gendered roles in effecting changes in reproductive cultures. Them ostf requently advanced argument suggests that rising public concern about maternal health and responsibilities drove the decline in family size (Ross, 1992; Seccombe,1 990) . Explicitf emalea gency in reducing family size has been suggested as ar esult of the economic power of highly-paid femalet extile workers (Gittins, 1982; Ittmann, 1995; Schwarzkopf, 2007) and amongst the increasingly educated and sometimes feminist women of the middle class (Mackinnon, 1997) . This narrative of a fertilityd ecline that followed female authority has been challenged by oral history testimonies which suggestthat interwar young women sought to distancethemselves from birth control, relyingi nstead on masculine 'skill' and 'considerate' behaviour (Fisher, 2006; Szreter &Fisher, 2010, pp. 229 -267) . This indicates the need not only to examine the relative authority of husbands and wives in reproductive decision-making,but also to explore how fertilitywas positioned in relation to otheraspects of gendered selfhood and familial intimacy.
Methods andc ontexts
This article draws on researcht hat was conducted as part of ab roader studyo fE nglish parenthood between1 850 and 1914. Al ocally comparative and deeplyc ontextualised approach was adopted, focusing on three large and contrasting provincial localities. The survival of archival sources determined the precise districtschosen. Table 1provides details of employment in the studied areas.
Thefirst localityisAuckland, acoal-mining district in County Durham, centred upon the market town of Bishop Auckland. By 19016 2% of fathersw orked in the mines. Another 16% worked in manufacturing, mainly in associated, heavy industries. Maternal employmentwas rare. About half of the population belonged to nonconformist Protestant denominations. Local government adopted aconservative, laissez-faire approach to social issues and the largely Anglican landed owners of the coal mines were influential.Sanitary conditions were poor in mining towns and villages and infant mortality was high.
Thes econd area,t he Lancashire town of Burnley, was alsod ominated by a nonconformist working-class population and, to al esser extent, by as ingle industry. Cotton mills employed just under one-third of fathers, while just over one-tenth of fathers worked in small coal mines. Up to one-third of mothersrecorded themselves as being in employment, primarily in weaving mills, and young femaleand male workersremained in demand. Local government contrasted politically with that in Auckland and many men and women prided themselves on their progressivism. Burnley was the northern strongholdo ft he Social Democratic Federation from the 1880s and of working-class suffragists from the 1900s. In spite of investmenti np ublic health infrastructure, infant mortality remained high.
Third, Bromley in Kent was amarket town that, with the arrivalofthe railway from the 1850s, became only a2 0minute train ride from London. By 1901 almost one-quarter of fathersh ad middle-and upper-class occupations. These families lived in newly-built suburban villasw here they enjoyed low mortality rates and aw ide range of amenities. The southern part of the district offered low-paid and declining opportunities for agricultural work, so that working-class parents were increasingly employed in service provision. In contrast to the strength of Nonconformity in the industrial towns, the Church of England dominated and those involved in local government advocatedc onservative paternalism. Many elitewomen participated in awide variety of voluntary philanthropic and increasingly politicalmovements, including some for women's rights.
It is important to establish what we know about quantitative trends in average fertility rates in theselocalities. By 1911 the population of each district reached just over 100,000 people. There are three features to highlight from the fertility rates presented in Table 2 . First, irrespective of locality, from the 1870s the average (mean) number of children that women bore declined. This was true of both legitimate and illegitimatefertilityrates. (Bengtsson&Dribe, 2006; Van Bavel &Kok, 2010a; Vann &E versley, 1992 , pp.1 52 -176). Likewise, there was no 'contraceptive revolution' to instigate the English fertilityd ecline. Ther eduction in the birth rate was achieved primarily through the postponement or avoidance of marriage and within marriage through abstinence or withdrawal (Cook, 2004, pp. 40 -164; S zreter &F isher, 2010, pp. 229-267) . This researchd oes not focus on methods of fertility limitation, but evidence from the studied localities supports this conclusion. There were no references to the use of barrierm ethods of contraception before 1914; instead, abstinence, extended breast-feeding and abortifacients were most frequently noted as methods that might limit child-bearing. Given that this suggests that continuities in methods coincided with this transformation in rates between1 870 and 1914, it is important to consider whate ither encouragedpeopletouse these practices more consistently or madeahigher proportion of adults willing to countenance their use.
This study works from the premise that men and women had agencyi ns ometimes thinking about and seeking to shape -o ften unsuccessfully or with unexpected consequences -t heir own lives, their capacity to generate future lives, and the lives of any sons and daughters. Aw ide range of qualitative archivala nd publishedp rimary sources were studied. Details are provided in Table 3 , but these included: publishedl iterature, especially newspapers and advice manuals; local manuscript records of schooling, justice, government and philanthropy; census enumerators' books; and all surviving personal documentss uch as letters, diaries, autobiographies and oral histories.A nalysis was primarily qualitative, using agrounded theory methodology; sources were transcribed and coded in order to facilitate the identification of common and distinctive themes.
First, this article examines critically the conceptualizationofchildren as economic and social burdens by considering the extent to which elitea nd then non-elite parents understood the 'cost' of their children to be increasing. Second, the emergence and communication of new cultural ideals of family are explored, by focusing on three models that legitimised particularfamily sizes. In each section, any distinctive patterns relating to class, place, gender or ethnicity are identified. It is arguedthat thosefathers and mothers who reduced their fertility earliest both perceived their duties towards their sons and daughterst ob er ising to new heights and drew on familial ideals that couldb eu sed to constructb irth control as am oral practice that couldl egitimately be explored within marriage.
The cost of children
In seeking to analyse demographic responses through the 'strains' placed on adults, it is necessaryt oc hart the changing demands that werem ade on the time and resources of Local newspapers Every edition of principal local newspapers was read for the three study localities 1859-61, 1869-71, 1879-81, 1889-91, 1899-1901, 1909-11 . Additional editions of these newspapers were sampled around selected dates National literature The content of every edition of the 13 child-rearing manuals that were published in at least five editions or 10,000 copies 1800-1914 was read and compared word-by-word Asample of national newspapers was also searched for specific themes and events
Census enumerators' books 1861 and 1901 2.5% sample of all men and women resident in the same household as at least one individual aged less than 21 years and described as son or daughter 1% sample of all children aged less than 21 years Further contextual details were accessed from all censuses 1841-1911 for named individuals parents by the law, the economy and societal expectations (Friedlander, 1983, pp. 266 -269 ). Yet it is also essential to gauge the extent to which men and women knew about these pressuresand how far they interpreted them as 'burdens' that were sufficiently weighty to influence their behaviour. It will be suggested that parents understood their roles in two class-specific ways. Elite fathers worried about the sustained responsibilities that their relationships with teenaged and adult sons and increasingly daughtersplaced upon them. Less wealthy parents,e specially mothers, focused on the immediate and increasing possibilities for providing care for younger children. Such contrasting perceptions of parenting influenced understandings of the points in the life-course when it was especially beneficial to try to avoid bearing more offspring.
Elite perceptions of sons and daughters
Men from substantial property-owning families where multiple servants were employed were most likely to use al anguage of 'costs' in discussing relationships with children. The correspondence betweenC harles Darwin, who was rearing his ' large &g rowing family' (at that point of seven children) and othergentlemen was typical in being littered with such fears, to such an extent that he remarked that 'I never meetany one who is not perplexedwhattodowith their children' (Darwin, C. letter to J. Higgins, 1850,December 21; Darwin, C. letter to S. Covington, 1857, February 22). Research into elite masculinities has catalogued the increasing cult, and resulting expense, of boys' public schoolsi nt he secondhalf of the nineteenth century (Banks,1954; French&Rothery, 2012, pp. 39 -136; Tosh, 1999 Tosh, /2007 . Gentlemen expressed concerns in all of the studied private letters and diaries about the future challenges of providing suitably for sons. Men'sunease related to three long-lasting duties: the expenseofprovidingtheir sons with an increasingly lengthy education; the social and organisational responsibility of selecting judicious career paths for their sons as competition multiplied; and unease about the provision of afairlydivided inheritance. The advertised prices for tuition at boys' private school ranged widely, but an increasingly high proportion of schoolst hat appealed to parents aroundL ondon offered the most expensive tuition and boarding. 1 For fathers who aspired to give their sons auniversity education, the annual cost of supporting ason at an Oxbridge college was more than triple the cost of aboarding school (Marsham-Townshend, H., accounts,1897).
Early nineteenth-centurypaternalworries had related overwhelminglytothe demands of rearingyoung men, such that sons wereperceived to be three-timesastroublesome as daughters (Darwin, C. letter to W.D. Fox, 1852,March 7) . From the mid-nineteenth century, fatherse xpressed growingc oncerns about the challenges of educating and supporting daughtersuntil adifficult to engineer, late or non-existent marriage.Bythe 1880s in southeast England there was the option of sending girls to private schoolsthat wereasexpensive as those of their brothers. Additionally, young women increasingly expected al engthy period of carefreeness to continue after their formal education ended. One gentlewoman recorded her friend's uneasewhenshe received aproposal of marriage in her early 20sin 1855: 'The poor child said amid her tears "I thought Iwas achild and that everybody would think me only achild, but now Ifind Iamawoman"' (Hall, E. M. diary, 1855, December 27) . This perception that girlhoodcontinueduntil marriage madeitpressing for fatherstoprotect their daughters' vulnerability and to provide for dependence that potentially lasted for many decades. From the 1850s, men increasingly understood their paternal duties to have doubled because they expanded with the birth of each daughter as well as each son.
In the mid-nineteenth century the primary means by which men prudentially avoided these responsibilities was by postponing marriage. Fathers urged this strategy on young men. One instance -r ecorded in unusualdetail -o ccurred in Lancashire in the late 1850s when Philip Hamerton, a24-year-old gentleman,was warned against early marriage by his prospective father-in-law, abanker and father of four.He'expressed the regret that in our class, afamily of children should be acause of weakness insteadofstrength', claiming that sons 'only weaken the father by draining away his income'. He warned that daughters had rejected their customary 'middle-class' roles as substitute servants and 'do nothing of the least use and require to be first expensively educated,a nd afterwards expensively amused' (Hamerton, 1897, pp. 213, 224-226) . Thep ostponement of marriage was not solely ar esponse to perceptions of parenthood, but thesef ormed part of as et of beliefs that publicly emphasised the disabling ties of early marriage.I nt his case,t he banker's daughter rejected the proposal and never married; Hamertonmarried aParisian woman the same year,b ut had only three children. Importantly, while men drew on this rhetoric of grudginglya ccepted liabilities,f athers also privately expressed intense feelings of loneliness,grief and sometimes hostility when their sons or daughters left home (Quennell, 1976, p. 12) . Active fatherhood was integral to male identities throughout this period, but it was principally through al anguage of burdensome duty that the significance of these relationships could be discussedwith male peersand communicatedintergenerationally.
Given these prudential warnings, it is not surprising that age at marriage rose most for elite men.Smaller increases in age at marriage for professionaland gentry women reduced the number of yearso ver which they were at risk of pregnancy and excluded their most fertile years (Rothery, 2009, pp. 680 -682; Szreter &Garrett, 2000, pp. 64 -67) . Beforethe late 1870s wealthy women seldom bore their final child before they reached their mid-40s and this 'starting' effect was the principal means by which elite fertilitywas limited.
Two caveats shouldb ep laced on this explanation for middle-class fertilityd ecline (Banks,1954) . First, these wealthy men who discussed new paternalduties werespatially concentrated in London and the surroundingc ommuter counties, as well as, to al esser degree, the suburbs of the large provincial cities (Rubinstein, 1988 ). Yet in suburban London men with lower-middle-class jobs seldom expressedt hese concerns about longlasting paternalduties. The sons of clerks or shopkeepers attended small private schools, but entered paid work early in their teenaged years, often acquiring residential, social and financial independence (Baxter, ca. 1920s, pp.7-10; Wells,1 934, pp. 115 -154) . Other sons and daughters provided essential labour in their parents' businesses. In 1885 George Allen, apublisherliving in Kent with eight children aged 11 -27, described proudly how 'I have six [children] at home all more or lessi nt he business.' He comparedh is family with that of his Australian brother-in-law:
We were much interested in the account of your children also we had al augh at what you said about the reverse of things in Australia to what they are here -Imean as to large families of course. In my case alarge family is aboon but in most cases it is the other way on Ithink especially nowadays ... (Allen, G. letter to J.T. Hobbes, 1885, November 29).
It is revealing that Allenwas not only aware that his expanding middle-classsocial circle viewed 'large families' increasingly unfavourably, but also that he was confidentthat this judgmentdid not fit his own experiences. In fact, for men of his generation who married before the late 1870s, this divergence -b etweena na wareness of elite male concerns that many older children became burdensomea nd an acceptance that once married they personally expected to raise alarge family -w as common.
Second, in none of the studied sources did fathers identify the task of providing immediate care and education for children aged under 12 yearsasanincreasing liability. Further, no mothersexpressedthe view that their duties to their younger or older children were newly demanding. Throughout this period many expressedf ears about child-birth and weariness at the constraints of breast-feeding. In 1878 41-year-old SibellaB onham Carter wrote to her mother-in-law about nine months after the birth of her eleventhchild, voicing these concerns:
This afternoon Is hall again drive out late, for Im ust call upon some friends whom Ih ave hardly seen this year. It is shocking how little one can do when there is at iny Baby to be attended to. Now that Ihave weaned mine Ihave much more leisure (Bonham Carter, S. letter to 'Granny', 1878, June 27).
What changedamongst elite women from the late 1870s was that -p artly due to the norm of al onger, idealised phase of relative freedom in girlhood -t hese women aspired to a wider variety of roles after child-bearing. Most prominent in diaries and letters were the attractions of practical and emotional closeness to husbands, of philanthropic and public roles, and of entertainment and travel. Elite women who married after the late 1870s -whetherc onservative, feminist or neither -r arely bore children beyond their mid-30s. This created an extra decade of less maternity-intense married life. For thosewomen who had married in their early-or mid-20s, this meant that they bore families of around five children, while the majority who had remained single for longer, bore three or fewer.None of the women revealed how they avoided child-bearing in their later fertile years. Nevertheless, for thesee litew omen, it was understandings of novel non-maternal roles from the final quarter of the nineteenth century, rather than perceptions of newly weighty maternal responsibilities, that were foremost in their minds.
Them uch-cited anxiety about the rising burden of providing for children was not a universaland immediate concern of all middle-and upper-class parents.Instead it formed adistinctively sustained part of aculture of elite prudential masculinity. It was only once these concerns about paternal duties coincided with wives' expressed and realisable aspirations that stretched beyond the maternal that elite fertilityw as systematically controlled not just through delayed 'starting', but also through 'stopping' within marriage.
Working-class and lower-middle-class perceptions of sons and daughters
The above explanationa pplied to no more than one-tentho ft he English population (McKibbin, 1998, pp. 44-45; Trainor, 2000, p. 681) . The majority of parents,i ncluding those from the lower middle class, didnot consider their relationships with teenaged and adult children to be changing. Instead,itwas the provision of suitable care for the youngest children that parents thought to be newly within their power. Although caring roles were taken on moref requently by mothers nationwide, thisi nterpretation was often also expressedb yfathers, especially in districts dominated by the textile industry.
Them ost universal change in understandings of non-elite parents'r oles related to new expectations of care for children aged under 12 and for ill children. Published commercial and didactic literature expressedr ising concerns about the 'suffering' of children, especially in the first two yearsoflife. Representations of both fathers and mothers as the potential saviours of their tragically 'delicate' children becameemotive in widelypublisheda dvertisements for children's patent medicines,c oinciding with the decreased frequencyw ith which parents experienced the death of ac hild beyond infancy (Woods, 2000, pp. 247 -309) . These caring duties were extended for mothers by the increasingly high standards of domesticity for which 'respectable' motherslaboured,especially in the early twentieth century (Bourke, 1994; Davin, 1978; Ross, 1993, pp. 195 -221) . Concerns were intensified by school attendance. Teachers expected high standards of cleanliness, but parents also considered schools to be unhealthy spaces. This prompted fathers and especially motherst ot ake on new roles in overseeing schooling by intervening to protect their children in these threatening non-domestice nvironments (Pooley, 2010, pp. 537 -541) . The 1911 census hassuggestedthat husbands who worked as shopkeepers and clerks were amongst the earliest to rear extremelys mall families from the 1870s (Anderson, 1998, pp. 182, 192-193) . These fathersa nd mothers seldom expressedt he belief that an orm of investing in children was diffusing from the state or the elite, but insteadf ocused on their expanding and progressive parental capacity to improve their children's lives voluntarily through providing abetter quality of care and education than they had experienced. This is not to suggestthat the financial cost of rearingchildren remained unchanged, but non-elite fathers and mothersseldom claimed that the rearing of children was newly economically draining. Living standards rose from the 1850s, especially through increasing real wages for industrial workers (Boyer, 2004, pp.282-290) . The highest rates of employmentearly in childhoodoccurred before 1870, so that asudden loss of children's income did not coincide with the period in which working-class parents reduced their family size (Humphries, 2010, pp. 172 -209) . In the studied localities,teenaged and adult children were increasingly valuable contributors to the household economy of their ageing parents,especially through the rising demand for daughtersaslive-in servantswho 'tipped up' wages (Census, 1861 and 1901) .
Thei ntroduction of compulsory elementary schooling in 1880, which was most financially burdensome until it was madefree from 1891, did coincide with increased nonelite fertilitycontrol. However, it shouldberemembered that most mid-nineteenth-century parents chose to give their sons and daughters sufficient schooling to makethem literate before education became compulsory, usually paying fees that wereh ighert han those charged by board schools (Vincent, 1989, pp. 22 -29, 66 -72) . Further, as ar esult of the failure of manyschool boards to enforce the legislation, fees were not acost that suddenly increased to unprecedented levels.S chool attendance authorities in both the large coalminingdistrict of Auckland and rural Bromley systematically failed to enforce attendance until at least 1902. Further, all of the studied Auckland schools and some Bromley schools cappedp arents'costs, so that if more than two or three children attended from the same family, the youngest children were schooled for free. Parents with al arge number of closelyspacedc hildren were thus recognised as deservingofs pecial assistance.
Thee xception to this was in the Lancashire town of Burnley, where the duties of parents were widelyemphasised and rigorously enforced.This region experienced an early and rapid decline in working-class family size from the 1880s. Men and women who worked as cotton weavers were paid identical wages (though opportunities for promotion were reserved for men) and fathers were routinely responsible for domestic choresa nd childcare (Gittins, 1982, pp. 95-124; Schwarzkopf, 2004, pp. 29 -46) . By 1901 28% of parents recorded themselves as part of adual-incomecouple, so that asizable minority of both fathersa nd mothers faced the doubled emands of paid work and intensifying expectations of childcare (Census, 1901) . While recorded maternal employment became rarer and more concentrated only in the poorest households in Bromley and Auckland, in Burnley the proportion of mothersrecorded in workincreased. Althoughthis view was not expressedbyparents in the studied sources, the opportunity cost of leaving work to care exclusively for many children was thus unusually high.
An exceptionally active range of mutual,philanthropic and local government agencies sought to ensure that Burnley parents fulfilled their responsibilities. School fees were on average twicet hosei nt he other studied localities and ah igher proportion of children stayed in education for the increasingly sought-after higher grades. In 1871 it was found that 81% of pupils paid betweentwo-and four-pence per week, but morethan one-tenth of pupils were paying four-pence or more ('Meetingofthe School Board',1871). These fees rose in all of the schoolsover the following 20 years. None of the studied Burnley schools recorded apolicy of capping the fees paid by families, so that the cost of schooling large families was unusually expensive. Although mostpeople justified these costsbyciting the perceived high quality of education and facilities, by 1891 aradical School Board member complained that 'in nearly all the board schoolsofthe country the fees were less than were now charged in Burnley' ('Burnley School Board',1891). The Board was alsorigorous in seeking to ensuret hat children attendeds chool for 10 half-days per week; it was, unusually, willingt ow arna nd fine' respectable' parents who failedt oc omply with the attendance by-laws (Pooley, 2009, pp. 80 -87, 174 -178) .
One typical case will be used to indicate this parental pressure.In1901 an inquest was reportedin The Burnley Gazette,followingthe deathofafive-year-old girl from burns she sustained while in the care of her eight-year-oldsister. The coroner warned her mother and especially father, both of whom were weavers, as follows: Do you think it is aproper thing for you men to take upon yourselves the responsibilities of parents, to go and get married, and have children, and then leave them alone in the house? ... The jury had taken the most lenient view, but if people would have children, and then, out of their own selfishness and greed for getting money, without making proper provision for looking after them, went and left children in the house, juries would have to take notice of it, and would bring in, instead of averdict of accidental death, averdict of manslaughter.
('The care of operatives' children ', 1901) The words of the coroner formed apowerful conclusion to acase in which the parents had described their efforts to provide non-parental child-minders. The coroner ended by stating that 'he hoped the reporters would insert his remarks in all the papers, so that it would be knownthat all well thinking men would not allow that sort of thing to go on.' The 'responsibilities of parents' were painfully prominent and frequently displayed to readers of these local newspapers, explicitly challengingparents' most intimatedecisions about wheni tw as appropriate to marry and how to provide suitablec hildcare. Caring duties werethus madepubliclyi ntegral to both fatherhood and motherhood.
From out of this unusually gendered regional economya nd the, linked, exceptional cultureofrigorously promoted parental responsibilities emergedEngland's most popular affordable child-rearingmanual. The wife's handbook was published by Henry Allbutt, a doctor in the nearby woollen manufacturing town of Leeds, in 1886 at the price of sixpence.B yi ts forty-fifth edition in 1913, 430,000 copies had been sold.I th as been presumedt hat this popularity resulted from its explicit instructions on methods of birth control (Fryer, 1965, pp. 169 -171 ). Yet Allbutt also provided unusually practicable instructions on childcare and offered ap ioneering conceptualisation of the relationship betweenh ealth, marriage and parenthood. Unlike other manuals that treated female and child health separately, the volume was structured around the mother's life-course, so that child-rearingw as integratedi nto al onger time-spano f' sufferings of women and children'. Thebook opened with the warning that 'From the first marriage-night no woman under forty-five yearsofage can consider herself SAFE'.Allbutt drew on anew rhetoricof idealised parentalomnipotence by which the child's constitutional health couldbeassured from birth. If parents ignored the laws of 'Nature', they would continue 'bringinginto the world feeble and puny children, born but to suffer and die'. Yet if they followed the 'laws', fathersand mothers gained the power 'to rescue from death and disease children who may be born' (Allbutt, 1887, pp. 3-5) . In linkingbehaviour in the marital bed to the duties of parenthood, Allbutt emphasised the responsibilities of knowledgeablea nd considerate husbands. The regulationo ff ertility was conceptualised as part of ac ultureo fm aternal and especially paternals elflessness engenderedb yt heir perceived capacity to ease children's suffering. We know too little about the readership of advice literature. Nevertheless, The wife's handbook was advertised nationwide, so it is likelythat it spread this culture beyond the occupational context from which it originated, thus encouraging a more sustained nationwide shift in perceptions of parentalduty.
Thus, we can explain the early fall in non-elite fertility through the awareness that 'respectable' parents expressed from the 1880s of the increasing duties that they believed they bore towards their youngestand most vulnerable children. Non-elite fertilitydeclined most in thoseareas where these responsibilities werethought most significant and where fatherswere mostinvolved in childcare. It is plausible to suggest that these expectations for new, demanding forms of care for younger children -b oth created by working-class parents and advocated by outside institutions -e ncouraged parents to seek to increase the gap between each pregnancy.
Ideals of family
Studies of sexuality have been unanimous in establishing the dominance of ac ulture of silencet hroughout these decades. Young women were shieldedf rom reproductive knowledge and couples struggled to discuss birth control. Cook has examined Edwardian mothers' efforts to pass on the revulsion that they felt about their own bodies and sexual experiences to their innocent daughters (Cook, 2012) . Contexts in which this silence could be respectably brokenw ere therefore important. This section focuses on three cultural ideals of family that were used to explore family size in new ways: adisciplined familial model; an ideal of the domesticated small family; and an aspiration for unbounded fertility. Thecomparative potency of theseideals in the studied localities is traced. It will be suggestedt hat even whenc ommentatorss ought to condemnb irth control, the act of speaking of reproduction through positive familial ideals createda lternative routes through which men and women couldthink about and potentially negotiate the adoption of birth control.
The disciplined family ideal
The first context in which al ink betweenf amilial ideals and family size was newly publicised was neo-Malthusian. Fertility control was conceptualised as one aspect of the disciplined and health-endowing regimes that had been advocateds ince Chartisma s am eans for fatherst os trengthen their own character and improvet heir families' lives (Clark, 1992; Gleadle, 2003) . The trial of birth control campaigners, Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant, in 1877 was exceptional in giving these views national publicity and is often interpreted as atriggerfor fertility decline (Caldwell, 1999; Mason, 1994, pp. 68-73, 195-213 ).
Yet, for at least ad ecadeb efore the Bradlaugh-Besant case,t he principlest hat underpinned this neo-Malthusian culturew erew idely and mundanely disseminated in the working-class dominated textiles towns of East Lancashire and West Yorkshire. Not only -a sestablished above -w ere duties towards young children understood to be heavy, buti nt his geographically-defined context, women and men werep ubliclyu rged to transform civic morality through reformed familial relationships. Importantly, these debates took place in public spacesthat were the epitomeofChristian morality. One typical exampleofthis was aWesleyanmissionarymothers' meeting in 1870, attendedbymore than 200 women. The nonconformist temperance lecturer and father of five, WilliamBell from the neighbouring textiles town of Bradford, declaredt hat having five children was better than having ad ozen since it enabled the family'sb read to last longer( Census, 1871). Although notasurprising conclusion, it is revealing that it was acomparison that was accepteda su ncontroversial in such ap ious setting. The speaker expanded on his understanding of the enormous influence of 'woman as acompanion, awife, amother,and aworker', using the exampleofa'well-educated young woman' he claimed to have met in Preston, anearby textilestown. Thewoman had declaredthat she did not want a'man', but a'husband, one that would look after the home. Ahousehusband;one who would keep the house together. One who wouldn'tsit at home smoking while his wife was workinginthe mill.' ('A mother's meeting',1 870) Irrespective of whether this was an apocryphal tale, similar models of authoritative wage-earning femininity and familial masculinity were commonly promoted from at least the 1870s. Efforts to limit family size were understood as ar ealistic mechanism for familial and then civic reform.
These ideals were promoted as shared by allm oral citizens, nota sc lass-specific concerns.One case of thesec ross-class relationships wasdescribed autobiographically by MaryBrown,the wife of adoctor. She wasthe mother of threechildrenbornbefore herthirtieth birthday, who-like theelite womendiscussed above -l ater tookonroles that made heraleadingfigureinthe public life of thetown. From herarrival in Burnley in 1879, when hery oungest childw as aged two, Browns ought to carryo ut 'social work'onbehalfofthe workingmen and'factorygirls'throughSundayschool classes. She recountedh ow:
Some years later when my influence was making itself felt, two young men came to see me, and this was their reason. "There are girls," they said, "that work in our mills, that we call Mrs. Doctor Brown's disciples. They are different and it is all because of you. We want you to come and speak to us young men that we may be better company for them young girls." (Brown, 1937, pp. 37 -38) .
Of course, only the stories of people affected figured in her account. Yet her effortswere just one of manyr eformistm issions that madef amily life ac oncern of civil society and latterly of local government, with the remakingo fm asculinity as ap articular priority. Importantly, these initiatives were successful as aresult of both the high proportion of elite residents involved and their mutual character, which meant that they were sustained through active working-class initiative.
It was because of this that birth control publications were welcomed in this region. Bradlaugh was an admired visiting radical speaker before the Fruits of Philosophy trial. The reporting of the campaigns of Bradlaugh and Besant made them two of the most prominently featured nationalfi gures in the local newspapers. One typical occasion that cemented this celebritystatus was atwo-night Mechanics' Institute philosophical debate in 1879 betweenBradlaugh and aCongregational minister, chaired by aBaptist minister, which attracted 'crowded audiences' ('Has or is Man', 1879). One attendee was Philip Snowden, the son of Wesleyanw eavers, who later attributed the campaigners'appealt o the attraction of their 'individualistic radicalism'. He alsorecalled their power as orators, recording 'I can see him [Bradlaugh] now as he stoodonthe platform. He was amassive figure, with afi ne head and ap owerful voice, and in declamation he was at remendous force', while Annie Besant 'eveno ns uch as ubject as birth control ... showed herself a superb orator' (Snowden, 1934, pp. 43 -44) . In these accounts it is lesswhat was said that was notable than the opportunity to hear theseradical matters spoken of by such eloquent celebrities and under the auspices of organisations that gave these topics legitimacy. On Bradlaugh's death, The Burnley Gazettep ublishedafeature on his life, including information on the pair's profession of 'what are called Malthusian opinions on the population question' and describing how:
The news of his death has produced aprofound impression upon the minds of his many friends and admirers in this town, and it is the general feeling that his life has been ag enerous and noble sacrifice to high principles, sincere love of truth and unselfish devotion to the duties of citizenship and humanity. ('Echoes', 1891) .
Not all the town's residents agreed with the reformers' agenda.H owever, it would be surprising if their widely-documented lives and the moral contextsi nw hich they were accepteda ss peakers did not encourage men and women to think about family size as something that could be placed respectablyunder personal control.
Thecontrast with the relationship betweenfamily life and public concerns in Auckland in County Durham is clear. In thiscoal-mining district, which was similarly dominated by an industrial working-class and nonconformistp opulation, the local newspaper reported on the secularism of Bradlaugh and Besant, but in the sampledn ewspapers there is no indication that they werei nvited to speak in the district, no mention was madeo ft heir attitudest ob irth control, praise was not offered of their principles and there was no coverage of Bradlaugh'sd eath. The characteristics that gave them celebrity status in Burnley as defenderso ft he peoplea nd as reformerso ft he family were presumably considered of no public interest, morally unsuitable or both.
Nevertheless,i tm ust be noted that even in these districtsw here public discussion of family life was rare, someindividualswere vociferous promoters of birth control. One neoMalthusian in Auckland was acoal-miner, Robert Robinson, whose wife variouslyworked as am antua-maker and grocer. When their daughter was born in 1877, they gave her a middlename of Bradlaugh (Census, 1911) . In 1880 Robinson invited aParisian to speak at a 'Fruit of Philosophy meeting' and the reaction of the public and of local journalists highlights the contrastwith the textile towns. The audience was reportedasfollows:
with the exception of three women -t wo old and one young -t here were only about thirty males present, the public showing their appreciation of the event by keeping on the sunny side of the door. Those three women were evidently in search of information under difficulties .... There's no accounting for taste. ('Scrutator', 1880).
As ar esult of the small audience, the meeting was cut short. The ridicule expressed towards thosew ho showed an interest in the discussion of fertility, especially women, suggests the infrequency with which the topic was discussed. Robinson justified the meeting af ortnight later by attacking the columnist 'Scrutator', as one of the 'would-be smart and "touch me not" moral sages' and a'high-class moralist'. He contended that 'the population question is open to discussion',o bjecting to 'working men and their wives being insulted by vile imputations and suggestive motives, which he doubtsw hether "Scrutator" would dare to suggesta gainst the eclat of society' (Robinson, 1880) . It is revealing that it was with accusations of class prejudice, rather than alternative familial principles, that Robinson defended his meeting.
While the public in the coal-mining district responded with indifference or ridicule to this attempt to make intimatel ife of public import, these issues are absentf rom local newspapers in suburban Bromley in Kent. It is not surprising that the middle-class journalists did not celebrate the radical democratic campaigners as their less elite Burnley colleagues did. Of course, both the 'population question' and the actions of Bradlaugh and Besant featured, usually negatively, in the nationalpress of which eliteBromley parents were readers (Banks &B anks, 1954) . However, it is significant to note the subject's exclusion from the medium that was most accessible to working-class readers and the perceived immorality of these discussions in this geographical context. The cultural construction of disciplined and moral family life as am eans of civic reform was thus powerfully normative in one locality, but was only patchily and controversially communicatedelsewhere in England.
The leisuredfamily ideal
Asecondfamilial ideal -o fthe leisured, domesticated small family -b ecame prominent only from the late 1890s and especially the 1900s. By this point, as discussedinthe opening section, many elite fathersand mothershad significantly limited their fertilityfor decades. There were two new important pathways through which the ideal of rearing only asmall number of children was communicated through nationalpublishedliterature to manylowermiddle-class and some working-class adults. In the districtss urrounding London this textual modelwas given particular social authority by the presence of neighbouring wealthy families whose comfortable lives contained only acoupleofchildren.
New idealised visual images of families were disseminated nationally from the late 1890s. Commercial advertisers had previously depicted whole family groups rarely, insteadimaginingchildren alone or occasionally in the care of amother or sibling. Out of a sample of more than 500 editions of local newspapers publishedbetween1859and 1901 and of popular child-rearingmanualspublished before1895, there were no advertisements that depicted afather,mother and children together. Yet while these images of individuals and dyads remained in use until 1914, an alternative image of family emergedf rom the late 1890s. In the nationalp ress, advice manualsa nd somel ocal newspapers (mostly in Bromley in Kent), nuclear family groups -c ontaining two parents and only two children -f eatured increasingly frequently. These images idealised modern family life that was domesticated, comfortable and leisured. The family group was shownspending exclusive time together, usually sat around adining table. Cadbury's was one of the first companies to disseminate this ideal of the modern private family who enjoyed healthy mutual bliss through drinkingc ocoa (Chavasse, 1913, p.xxi) .
From the mid-1900s, this domesticity began to be imagined in less class-or placespecific ways. Whereas domestic servantsh ad featured in earlier images of domesticity, they were seldom shown in familial scenes from c.1905 onwards.D epictions of furnishings and dress became simplea nd cosy rather than luxurious. This standard of domesticity was becoming affordable for skilled working-class families in these decades, if only in their frontrooms and on Sundays. It would be surprising if the sudden emergence of thesei mages in aw ide range of working-class and middle-classp ublications did not have an impact on men's and women's perceptions of whom arespectable English family contained and how it behaved.
This model of the privatef amily that depended on the company of only ac oupleo f children was also publicised unintentionally as modern and advantageous through the reporting of discussions of 'national degeneration' from the late 1890so nwards. Commentators warned that while the degenerate poor continued to bear manyc hildren, wealthier parents restricted their family sizea st hey became' selfishly' seduced by amusements. One journalist summarised the causeso ff ertilityd ecline in the mid-priced Illustrated London News as follows:
if ...people give their entertainments at restaurants instead of at home, and if much of life's leisure is spent in frivolities which make the home adesolate and deserted place, we cannot feel surprised that the family circle of old has come to represent an almost extinct idea. (Wilson, 1904) Amongstnewspapercommentatorsthere was little consensus as to whethermale or female choices were mostr esponsible for this perceived transformation through fertility of familial lifestyle. Whereas male choices were typically described in approving terms as those of the 'longheaded, far-sighted rising man'( Our declining birth-rate, 1910), women who did not prioritise maternity were more pejoratively imagined as 'too advanced for that, too educated,t oo cultured, too fond of talking about the equality of the sexes' (Harris,1899) .
Importantly, clergymen from all denominations were the leading voices in expounding these warnings that the national press publicised further.T hese pious men, with the authority to speak on matters of private conscience, legitimised the discussion of the link betweenreproduction and family life, by making couples' reproductive behaviour amatter of nationals ignificance. Although ministers spoke to warn against pursuing this path of 'selfishness', their speeches simultaneously presented the small family as modern, educated, elitea nd beneficial to one's personal success.
2 All of the identifiablem arried eminentc lergymen who spoke in this way had large families. The positive tone of their condemnation was perhaps due to the average family size of ministers beingamongst the smallest by 1911, presumably led by their junior colleagues (Szreter, 1996, pp. 312 -313) . In making intimate life the subject of unprecedented public discussion, thesea rbiters of morality raised popular awareness -a nd arguably acceptance -o ft he principle of restricted parental fertility.
It was in the London-based press and by newspaper correspondents who identified themselves as dwelling in the capital's wealthier suburbsthat 'race suicide'was discussed most vigorouslyinthe decadebefore 1914. 'Degeneration' was only haphazardly reported in the provincial local newspapers, which were read by ah igherp roportiono fw orkingclass households (McKibbin, 1998, pp. 503-506) . This was especially trueincoal-mining Auckland where one tiny re-published article mentioned these debates in the sampled newspapers. Journalists presumably thought these heated 'national' discussions wereo f little interest in ad istrict where large families continued to be normal.
However, in wealthy southern districtsthe belief that family size was inversely related to social status influenced the language and aspirations of at least some non-elite adults. One unusually explicit example of this is al etter sent by 'A mother of three' to a newspaperins uburban Kent in 1909, complaining that: Ih ave lately applied to five different landlords for ac ottage, and each have refused me on account of my children. Will either of them tell me what to do with them, as the law will not let me kill them, and the Union [workhouse] is full ....Because I've three children people say the birth rate is dying. As far as Iamconcerned it might never have lived, since small fingers tear off the wall paper that is never put on, and so prevent us getting acottage. ('A mother of three ', 1909) The polite nationaldiscussion of the threat of the 'dying' birth rate had publicised anew vocabulary on which poor parents, as well as middle-class fatherss uch as the publisher discussedabove, drew. Themother sought accommodation for arent of eightshillings out of her meagre weekly wage of 18 shillings. Theworking class in thisprosperous locality were vulnerable to the moral judgments and actions of their wealthy neighbours who wielded authority as landlords, employers and philanthropists, to an extent that was unthinkable in the working-class-dominated industrialdistricts. The mother's family size of three children was below average for rural labourers, but it is unclear whether she agreed with thosewho categorised her fertility as the result of deliberate control.The model of the compacted domesticated family increasingly resonated with men and women from across the socio-economic hierarchy. However, fertility limitation withinmarriage to meet these norms was imposedt hrough externalm oral and materialp ressure as well as selected through aspirational choice.
The unbounded fertile family ideal
In examining patterns of fertility change,itisalso essential to explain why many men and women did not reduce their fertility. Alongsidet he emergence of thesen ew models of disciplined civic and of domesticated privatefamily life, other parents proudlycelebrated their capacity to father or bear many children up to 1914. These ideals of unrestrained fertilitywere notably potent amongst fathers living in districts whoselabour market was dominated by highly-paid male labour and amongst ethnically Irish Catholic mothers.
In coal-mining districts maternal paid work and paternald omestic labour were negligible, gendered roles were sharply defined, and men and women formed themselves into distinct social worlds (Church, 1986, pp. 611-637) . In Auckland in County Durham women'sf ertilityr ates were about 50% highert han average for Englanda nd Wales. Although women married slightly later in the late nineteenth century, marital fertility increased, reaching an ew recorded high in 1908 ( 'Bishop Auckland Health', 1909) . Virility was greatly valued by fathers, but women often expressed less pride in their large families. Harold Heslop,b orn in County Durham in 1898, later described women's attemptst oi ncreaset he number of months betweenp regnancies by breast-feedingu ntil their children reached three years. In spite of his mother's efforts, Haroldrecalled that 'our family was increased to five boys. Grandmother Whitfield was not highly excited about the fecundity of her daughter,but, being awise woman, she did not expostulate in the presence of my father' (Heslop, 1994, p. 82) . Isabella Heslop eventually bore eightchildren in 18 years of marriage to William Heslop,aPrimitive Methodist pit foreman. She died in childbirtha ged 39. Although only their son's account exists, the unchallengeable patriarchal rights of men in these coal-mining districts gave women few effective means of resistingnormative expectations that men should father large families. Sustained gendered interestswere expressed through unspokenand accepted campaigns in opposite directions, rather than through explicit conflict over the frequency of child-birth.
While it was more common for married women to focus on mothers' struggles, some expressedpride in bearing and rearingmanychildren. These attitudeswere understood to be particularlyc entral to Irish Catholic identities. Such attitudest of amily size can be glimpsed from insults used by ethnically Irish women in disputes in both industrial localities. In 1861 moret han 10% of fathersa nd mothersi nc oal-mining Auckland had been born in Ireland, compared to almost 6% in the textiles town of Burnley and under 3% in suburban Bromley.
One typical incidentoccurred in Burnley in 1910 when afight broke outbetween37-year-oldAnnie Westwell and 32-year-old Ada Naughton, allegedly watched by '500 -600 people'. Naughtonwas reported to have insulted Westwell, awaste-sorter who had been married to acoal-hewer for 13 years, by saying '"I have nine kids ... and they are all Irish fox terriers. She has no kids".' ('Excitingstreet scene watched by 600 people ', 1910) . Both Ada Naughton and herhusband, alabourer,were born in Lancashire, but she appears to have understood her large family as an essential part of an ethnically Irish identity, such that her tenacious children were ap oint of pride with which she could insult her older childless adversary. Interestingly, in the census of the following year,Ada initially recorded that she had only borne five children during 13 years of marriage,all of whom she claimed remained alive. This was subsequently corrected, apparently by the enumerator, to arecord of only four living and five dead children out of the nine children born (Census, 1911) . Comparison with civil registration records suggests that one baby had recently died, but in the heated street-scene in 1910 Ada enumerated at least four already-deadchildren amongst the 'nine kids' about whose births she expressedangry pride. High femalefertility-understood in terms of the number of children born, not the number raised to adulthood-was drawn upon by mothers as part of ap roud idealo fc ulturally Irish Catholicf amilyl ife. Contingent parentale xperiences, such as bereavement, natural infertility, and gendered marital authority shapedthe relish with which such ideas were used.
It is likelythat at the sametime as new ideals of both disciplined and domestic small families became more prominent, thosewho bore large families felt the need to defend more vociferously the children with which they were surrounded. Far from acknowledging or adopting the labels of moral weaknessorclass deterioration, theseadults constructed their family size as amarker of aproud sectarian identity. While published and official agencies communicatedmodels of family life more rapidly and nationally, the oral communication of alternative norms carried ap otency and immediacy that these could lack. Models of family were relational and in explaining why somemen and women reduced their family size, it is essential to also understand the ideals of unbounded fertilityf rom which they sought to differentiate themselves.
Conclusions
Men's and women'sunderstandings of child-bearing, child-rearingand childlessness help us to explain why some adults reduced their fertility in late nineteenth and early twentiethcentury England. This evidence for shifting meanings is inevitably patchyand riddled with silences. Individual-level longitudinal data would be invaluable in enabling the correlation betweene xperiences, ideasa nd births to be examined across fathers' and mothers' reproductive careers.
Thisstudy doesnot support thetheorythatadultsadjustedtheir fertilityinresponseto auniversal transformation of children from economically-valued assets to emotionallyvalued burdens. First, emotional, social,o rganisationala nd financialb onds between parentsa nd childrenw erei nseparable.T he impositiono falanguageo fr ational calculationdoesnot further understandings of reproductivebehaviour.Second,the extent to whichparents perceivedtheir children to be increasinglyburdensomehas been overestimated.Somegroups felttheir responsibilitieswererising-most notably elitemen in relationt ot heir olderc hildrenf romt he 1850sa nd 'respectable' non-elite parents, especiallym others,i nr elationtot heir youngerc hildrenf romt he 1880s.O ther parents showed no signso fb elieving that children were increasinglyi mpoverishingo r exhausting.T hisc ontinuity in perceptionso vert ime andb etweeng enerationsh elps to explainwhy twoout of thethree studiedlocalities andmostoccupations didnot altertheir position in aranking of averagefertility rates (Woods, 2000, pp. 119-122) .Third,these understandings of dutywere neithersimplydiffusedfromelitetonon-elite parents, nor legislativelyimposed by thenationalstate. Instead, menand womendrewonavariety of oftenlocal andcontingentexperiences in concluding that they hadanincreased, shared capacitytoimprove thelives of theirchildren. Forexample,while middle-classcouples might appear superficially to have adopted as ingle' pioneering' norm of controlling fertility,w ealthyp rofessionalp arents andl ower-middle-class shopkeepersw ere motivatedbycontrastingperceptions of howtheir responsibilities towardstheir children were changing. The motivations to alter reproductivebehaviour were locallyand patchily expressed, so it is not surprisingthatfertilitydeclines occurred with differenttimingsand ratesinthe threestudied localities.
Men'sand women'smotivations for controlling fertilityasaresult of their experiences of parenthood were fundamentallyd ifferent. The size of af amily was most likelyt ob e limited whenh usbands as well as wives considered not bearing ac hild everyt wo years during their fertile lives to be advantageous. From the studied evidence,s ome sort of marital agreement emerged in three contexts, which suggesti nteresting parallels with demographic evidence from other national contexts. First, men's and women'sroles were experienced mosts imilarly in areasw ith high rates of valued female employmenta nd male unpaid domestic work, such as in the northernt extiles districts. Notions of equal civic citizenship were also strong, further strengthening the ideal of mutually investing in children as am eans of improving society. Second, in suburban London, 'respectable' lower-middle-class men and women agreed upon complementary gendered roles. Diligent male breadwinners supported increasingly feminised and intensive childcare, especially for 'delicate' children, alongside higherstandards of domesticity and schooling. This was understood to be the pathway through which parents offered their children explicitly 'modern' advantages. Third, upper-middle-class and upper-class fathers expressed concerns about their long-lasting duties to supporto lders ons and daughtersf rom the 1850s. Yet it was only from the 1870s, once wives expressed aspirations to take on roles that were less maternity-focused, that couples significantly reduced their fertilitya fter marriage.E ach of these strategic and often unspoken areas of agreement between husbands and wives depended on women expressingt heir aspirations and men valuing their wives' contributions. Relative equality in class and gendered terms made it more likely that men and women successfully restricted their familysize. Marital conflict was seldom mentioned in the surviving sources, but it must not be assumed that it did not form part of these relationships.
These perceptions that the tasks of parenthood were newly significant did not automatically lead to changesi nr eproductive behaviour. As Woods and Caldwell hypothesised, the mostr apid and profound transformations in fertility occurred when cultural understandings of family life emerged that enabled couples to think -f or the first time -a bout the limitation of births in contextst hat were understood to be moral (Caldwell, 1999; Woods,1 987) . These malleable models gained particular power in specific social and geographical contexts. It is suggestedt hat the use of the ideal of the disciplined, pure familyi nt extile towns of northernE ngland from the 1870s and of the domestic leisured family in suburban districts surrounding London from the late 1890s contributed to the rapid local falls in average fertilityi nt he following decades. Moral spaces and incontrovertibly respectable people -c lergymen, philanthropic women, civic meetings, local government initiatives, and their reporting in the press -w ere essential in publicising ideals of small families. Oral historytestimonies have demonstrated that birth control was understoodtobeamasculine responsibility, defined 'as asexual matter rather than adomestic one' (Fisher, 2006, p. 211 ). Yet while methods for limiting fertilitywere conceptually detached from women's child-rearingr esponsibilities, it was throught he rhetoric of family that both men and women began to respectablye xpress the appeal of fewer children. Priort o1 914, it seems likelyt hat these moral contexts were essential in making birth control methods,w hich wereu nderstood to be shamefully obscene, sufficiently thinkable to be widelyp ractised by men and women who thought of themselves as 'respectable'.
Children had always madedemands on their parents.Attention to adults' perceptions has revealed that some fathersa nd mothers understood their parental duties to be increasingly interconnected and significant. They believedt he ways in which their sons and daughters were raised had far-reaching positive implications for their own lives, their children's life-chances or societal well-being. Simultaneously, parents from otherl ocal, ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds,especially in the studied coal-mining district,did not perceive their duties to be newly challengingoractively celebratedamodelofhighly fertile parenthood. Chronological specificity is essential in explaining motivations. Utterly different expectations of parenthood were powerful in the 1850s, when only elite men sought to limit their duties by postponing marriage, comparedt ot he 1910s when reproductive control within marriage was widely legitimised through moral familial ideals.Parents who reduced their family sizelater did not simply follow the same process with the same motivations as their predecessors. Thes hifting interpretations that fathers and mothersplaced on their relationships with their children thus help to make sense of the partial, locally-diverse and class-specific pathways by which some women and men were motivated to transform their reproductive behaviour prior to 1914.
